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Abstract
The goal of this project is to create an easy to use, extensible, and engaging method to compute scores 
interactively during a practical cyber security education. Gamification has been shown to be an effective 
teaching tool and has been used in the offensive cybersecurity education space (via Capture The Flag 
competitions and challenges such as hackthebox.eu) but there has not been an open-source effort to bring 
this idea to the defensive side (blue team) aspect of cybersecurity. The Automated Remote Security 
Scoring Engine (ARSSE, pronounced "Arsh") uses a combination of well maintained open-source tools 
and custom connectors to facilitate an easy to use, scalable, and secure system to check the state of a 
computer system against a desired state and award points based on passed checks. ARSSE has been 
released to the public with the hope that it will fill a gap in training the next generation of information 
security professionals.
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The number of devices connected to the Internet keeps increasing every day, Gartner estimates 
5.8 billion devices by the end of 2020 which will be a 21% increase from 2019 (gartner.com). These 
devices range from smart speakers to crucial infrastructure such as smart meters and building automation 
(security devices, heat, lighting, etc). Gartner estimates that 1.3 billion of these devices are in the utilities 
section and estimates 38% of these will be smart electricity meters which shows that the Internet of 
Things (IoT) market is expanding into critical infrastructure. The increase in connected devices has 
outpaced the ability of the education system to fill roles that are crucial in supporting the security and 
management of these devices, with reports estimating about 3.5 million open cybersecurity jobs in 2020 
(Herjavec Group) and filling this gap between supply and demand shows a need for more efficient and 
engaging education in the cybersecurity field.
Computer security education involves hours and hours of self-paced work to learn what is normal 
behavior and configuration. In addition, the various different possible configurations of a system make it 
hard to design one training solution that fits all situations. Many cybersecurity concepts are tedious and 
mentally menial tasks like user auditing or just writing secure configuration files, all of this leads to a 
curriculum that is not engaging. Gamification has been shown to improve engagement by increasing the 
feedback rate and identifying pain points early (Huang and Soman). With this in mind, gamification 
seems like a good idea to try and tackle this crucial shortage of trained cybersecurity workforce as the 
world moves to put more personal data and critical national infrastructure online.
Background
A prevalent method of gamifying cybersecurity education is via live competitions. The classic 
live competition that most people are familiar with is the Capture the Flag (CTF) style in which 
individuals or teams compete against each other to find the highest number of flags. Flags are usually 
long alphanumeric strings often starting with a special denotation (ex flag_) to signify the flag has been 
found.
Another form of live competition is simulation exercises such as The National Collegiate Cyber 
Defense Competition (NCCDC) organized by the University Of San Antonio, Texas (UTSA). These 
exercises simulate a scenario that generally has competitors playing the role of cybersecurity 
professionals in a company (blue team) while they are being attacked by a group of penetration testers
(red team). Other competitions like Panoply (cyberpanoply.com) combine the CTF aspect with the 
scenario competition to create king-of-the-hill style competitions.
While vastly different approaches live competitions, CTFs and the king of the hill style 
competitions engage participants by providing quick feedback and timely rewards for success and this is 
key in a gamification strategy. This ability to be able to provide quick feedback is key to a successful 
gamification strategy. Creating a good game is a balancing act between various factors that affect 
engageability and ease of deployment,
Prior Work
Live competitions are a useful teaching tool for cybersecurity due to their complex 
multidisciplinary nature. This significance has been stated in many studies, the paper “Conceptual 
Analysis o f Cyber Security Education based on Live Competitions'" (Katsantonis et al.) studied already 
existing literature on this topic to derive aspects of live competitions such as concepts, characteristics, 
problems, and challenges. Since a simple search for keywords returned a lot of literature, the research 
team used predefined criteria to find valid papers to include in their study. This filtering based on four 
criteria produced a final list of 34 papers. The paper produces a concept map (invented by Novak in the 
1970s) of all characteristics of live competitions, these were then merged into groups such as contest form 
(Attack, Defend, Jeopardy, etc). Each group was crosslinked with other related groups. This concept map 
was used to construct a comparative analysis scheme that could be analyzed using three approaches for 
determining the educational impact of live competitions.
Cybersecurity training for computer users has been ongoing for a while now. “Exploring Game 
Design for Cybersecurity Training"" (Nagarajan et al.) describes the traditional techniques of cybersecurity 
education and their shortcomings. The paper proposes using “resource management simulation games" 
and “first-person interaction games” to solve the shortcoming of traditional cybersecurity training 
methods such as Web-based sessions, computer-based sessions (labs or CD-ROMs), IT Security Days, 
etc. The paper talks about already existing games with a heavy focus on a simulation game called 
CyberNEXS. The paper also discusses how computer game design concepts can be used for enhancing 
cybersecurity training and again uses CyberNEXS as an example when applicable.
A major issue in cybersecurity education is keeping the trainees’ attention. It has been shown that 
using games to support various business sectors has increased the level of interest and activity (Prensky). 
“A video game for cybersecurity training and awareness ” (Cone et al.) describes a highly customizable
cybersecurity training videogame called CyberCiege developed by the Naval Postgraduate School in 
2005. This paper created multiple custom CyberCIEGE scenarios for the U.S. Navy Individual 
Augmentee (IA) program: one for IT staff and a few scenarios for other users which emphasized various 
risks such as the distribution of worms and viruses.
The GenCyber Capture The Flag (CTF) was created with funding from the NSA’s GenCyber 
program and is primarily focused on middle and high school students. GenCyber is designed for students 
who have no previous security knowledge and is structured like a tutorial with hints and all resources 
needed to solve the challenges packaged with the CTF itself (McDaniels et al.). A major challenge for 
gamification of education is set-up and repetition (Katsantonis et al.), GenCyber solved this issue by 
hosting the entire environment consisting of 24 servers on the Remotely Accessible Virtualization 
Environment (RAVE) Lab (McDaniels et al.). During summer 2015, this CTF was run in 12 different 
camps involving about 400 total participants with some camps using teachers from across the K-12 range 
as participants.
Another challenge with education is figuring out what to teach. Established subjects such as 
physics have identified their “core concepts” that students need to understand before they can be taught 
more advanced topics. Cybersecurity education is a new field with no established core concepts. Core 
concepts are timeless i.e. they do not change due to changes in technology, and also need to be hard topics 
that may prove to be the hardest barrier to mastery (Parekh et al.).
Camps and peer learning could be a useful tool for cybersecurity education. To test this, an 
observational study was designed in the form of a cybersecurity camp. There was no direct help provided 
by the researchers apart from three booklets containing headings and knowledge points associated with 
the topic for the day. Camp sponsors wanted to have general learning objectives and decided on secure 
systems administration, network security, and cryptography to provide for a large variation in participant 
background (Pittman and Pike).
Students at the US Air Force Academy (USAFA) would compete in CTF’s and other 
cybersecurity competitions (e.g. NCCDC) for fun. Student motivation was significantly greater while 
learning for these competitions than for traditional class assignments (Carlisle et al.). Due to this 
observation, USAFA took their “cyber-related” curriculum and converted it into a CTF framework. 
USAFA offers a “Cyber Training elective” that is taken by about 17% of their sophomores, this class 
exposes the students to cyber topics through a CTF and combines it with peer learning by having juniors 
and seniors who have taken the course mentor the current students.
While most research discussed above has focused on using gamification to teach the technical 
skills required for cybersecurity, the University of Texas at San Antonio (UTSA) developed an active
learning curriculum to teach the management aspect of cybersecurity as part of its graduate-level 
program. This curriculum focused on managerial aspects such as security principles, incident response, 
digital forensics, and security assessments (Conklin). This focus on business led to the creation of a 
competition (NCCDC) that not only focused on the technical aspects of defending a network but also 
completing managerial tasks known as business injects. Started as an internal exercise, this competition 
has now grown to over 200 competing teams from across the US and Puerto Rico (Communications, 
Raytheon Corporate).
Findings from Prior Work
Katsantonis et al. found some inherent problems with live competitions as an educational tool. 
The paper found that setting up a competition as an educational tool has to balance various aspects 
encompassing various aspects such as the competition organizer’s bias towards certain topics all the way 
to logistical challenges like choosing a time frame that simulates nuances in the real world to technical 
challenges (e.g. limited resources). Katsantonis et al. built a concept map of all the different aspect a live 
competition for cybersecurity education has to take into account
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Figure 1: Concept map of live competition characteristics (from Katsantonis et al.)
Figure 1 shows how a successful live cybersecurity exercise has to balance many different aspects 
to make it engaging, challenging, and easy to set-up. This research showed that contest form, participants 
and infrastructure had the most links to other characteristics and thus shows that these aspects are often 
the hardest to balance. The NCCDC styled competitions focus on intermediate to expert participants, 
defending against professional adversaries, and reliability. These competitions also require all skills from 
the background characteristics and thus makes it a good template to use for all-round cybersecurity 
education. Where these competitions get hard is the scalability of their virtual or physical infrastructure 
along with the time required to prepare them. A weekend event like the CCDC also suffers from some of 
the issues the authors identify with short competitions such as students preparing for short term solutions 
like aggressive log storage without analyzing the stain it may have on limited storage space or CPU 
power. A weekend-long competition also does not focus on thinking about long-term security policies 
such as patching or supporting legacy applications but the CCDC competitions account for this by 
introducing the dynamic of injects (business tasks) that include tasks that range from updating software, 
creating backup infrastructure to creating a backup plan.
The CCDC encompasses more characteristics from Figure 1 than simpler, more focused 
competitions like CTFs or jeopardy styled competitions. While CTFs cover a wider range of participants 
(experts for the DefCon CTF to novices for the NYU CSAW CTF), they only tend to focus on the attack 
side of computer security and limit themselves to very specific topics that mostly center around scripting 
and reverse engineering. The jeopardy styled competitions like Panoply bridge this gap by scoring based 
on how well you can capture a flag and then defend that service to prevent another team from replacing 
your flag with theirs and provide a range of services that could satisfy novices and experts alike. Panoply 
and other jeopardy style games are a good combination of the pros and cons of CCDC and CTF styled 
competitions. These competitions still suffer from not training participants for long term goals like 
considering resource limitations or keeping services running for an extended amount of time.
It seems like the ideal exercise would take the pros from all these 3 different approaches and 
merge them into one exercise so a CCDC styled competition that also allows you to attack other teams 
and plant flags in their services while defending your network from other teams and handling injects. 
While great for participants of all levels, this would be a hard competition to pull off on the organization 
and infrastructure aspects but a solution that merges traditional class homework such as performing 
research into vulnerabilities or writing planning documents (e.g. upgrade policies) to simulate CCDC 
style injects would make a practical and engaging curriculum. This hybrid approach will add more work 
for the instructor so it is crucial for the success of the program to find ways to reduce this workload. This
need to create an easily deployable, extensible, and configurable system is what led to the idea of this 
project.
All the research into the idea of gamification of cybersecurity education points towards 3 big 
issues: identifying a curriculum, gauging and maintaining engagement, and developing an easy to deploy 
and modify system to run these exercises. The NCCDC method has been proven to work for maintaining 
engagement as can be seen from its growth from a pilot project with 5 participating teams in 2005 to more 
than 235 teams in 2020. The NCCDC is a good model but requires lots of manpower and machine power 
to set-up and run and is not feasible as a model to teach a typical college class with a single instructor, a 
varying number of students, and the potential need to run multiple exercises over a semester, McDaniels 
et al., solved this issue by packaging all aspects of their system into a single virtual machine image. This 
approach allowed them to rapidly deploy copies for their camp participants along with making it easier to 
share their system with others who may want to use it.
Scope
Taking inspiration from CTF competitions and the NCCDC CCS client, The ARSSE project is 
designed to provide a CCDC style experience that can be designed to train a single student or a team of 
students while providing them with live feedback and being easy for instructors to design and deploy. 
ARSSE is designed keeping the following goals in mind:
1) Easy to use
2) Engaging
3) Highly customizable and extensible
4) Scalability
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “Gamification” as “the application o f typical elements o f  
game playing (e.g. point scoring, competition with others, rules ofplay) to other areas o f activity, 
typically as an online marketing technique to encourage engagement with a product or service”. ARSSE 
borrows elements from a typical CTF and the NCCDC to provide point-scoring and competition with 
others by providing students with discrete challenges to compete for points and letting all students see 
their ranking and points. ARSSE uses gamification to teach computer security in an engaging manner.
System Architecture
Overview
As mentioned earlier, setting up an NCCDC styled exercise with a simulated network takes weeks 
and is not suitable for a university class where you may need multiple labs every week or the ability to 
change labs/homework rapidly. ARSSE solves this issue by decoupling the challenge creation system 
from the actual challenge machines themselves. This allows the instructor to set up machines that have 
more challenges than those being scored and add them to the scoring system if the initial lab is deemed 
too easy, or remove challenges that are found to be too hard for students. The live scoreboard and ability 
to see what challenges have been completed by students will empower the instructor to make informed 
decisions to dynamically change their exercise. ARSSE achieves this by separating the scoring from the 
student controlled machines as shown in the image below
Figure 1: ARSSE Architecture
Figure 1 shows the three different networks that compose the ARSSE system: the student network 
(StuNet), scoring network (ScoreNet), and cloud network (CloudNet). For now, let us ignore the cloud 
network and focus on the “Student network” in the yellow background and the “Scoring network” in light 
gray because this is where the separation that allows for quick reconfiguration of challenges happens.
Design Rationale
Any system that involves grading students must be highly available and possess high data 
integrity.
Data integrity is hard to achieve since any process on a machine controlled by the students can be 
considered to be hostile. Trusting any data coming from these machines added a requirement that the 
ARSSE system must be able to prevent the students from manipulating scores but this is hard since the 
students have full access to the machines and can potentially modify the score data gathered by any 
scoring mechanism running on the machines in StuNet. The UTSA CCS client solves this issue by 
making their system closed source and adding hard to enforce regulations that disallow modifying the 
CCS program and any related files. The ARSSE architecture solves this data integrity issue by moving all 
scoring to machines that are not controlled by the students (i.e. machines in ScoreNet). This architecture 
ensures data integrity since students should never have access to the scoring machines and that scoring 
code is not run on StuNet machines. This does add the requirement that students must always allow some 
kind of remote access from ScoreNet into StuNet, this is a fair compromise since Inspec uses standard 
protocols like SSH and WinRM.
In today’s world, most computer networks are behind Network Address Translation (NAT) and 
firewalls. Some firewalls could be very restrictive and only allow common traffic like web browsing. This 
limitation restricts the deployment of StuNet machines to a network that allows SSH or WinRM access 
from the ScoreNet machines. This often means that both StuNet and ScoreNet will have to either live in 
the same virtual environment or internal network. This is a fair compromise to provide data integrity and 
also provides the added benefit of reduced scoring latency.
Based on the research of prior work and the author’s experience with the UTSA CCS system, this 
approach of moving the scoring to a network and hosts that are controlled by the students and only need 
very limited access into the competition network is a novel architecture. Competitions like CCDC and 
Panoply use external scoring engines to test services but are only restricted to services available externally 
(e.g. a website) and cannot run checks (e.g. checking if a user exists) that require access to the student 
machines. The ARSSE architecture combines the ease of use of an external scoring system along with the
flexibility of checking anything on the machine that would come with a system based on running the 
scoring on the students’ machine.
Scoring Network
The scoring network consists of one or more scoring nodes. A scoring node is a machine 
(preferably Linux) running Chef InSpec (InSpec) and the ARSSE scoring module. InSpec was chosen 
since it is an actively maintained and well-documented tool that is designed to verify the current state of a 
machine against a predefined intended state of the machine. These properties meet the easy to use and 
highly customizable and extensible goals of ARSSE.
InSpec uses a Domain Specific Language (DSL) that is easy to read and write and does not 
require any programming knowledge. This DSL makes it easy to use but advanced users can extend its 
functionality by writing custom Ruby code. InSpec provides built-in resources that cover many 
commonly inspected parts of a machine (filesystem, firewalls, users, registry keys, etc) that can be used to 
check compliance.
describe port(22) do
it { should be_listening }
its('addresses') { should include '0.0.0.0' } 
its('protocols') { should cmp 'tcp' } 
end
Listing 1: InSpec example for the port resource 
Listing 1 shows a simple example to check if the target machine has TCP port 22 listening on all 
interfaces. As shown, the InSpec tests are very human-readable and easy to write. These tests are also 
operating system (OS) independent so can be reused for multiple machines running various versions of 
Linux and Windows.
Ensuring the integrity of the scores is important to make ARSSE viable in an academic setting or 
NCCDC styled competition, ARSSE achieves this by isolating the ScoreNet from the StuNet to the 
maximum extent possible and using InSpec’s ability to check hosts remotely via SSH or WinRM. This 
allows architecting a very secure ScoreNet since each host only needs SSH or WinRM access to the 
StuNet and does not require any scoring services to be running on student controlled machines.
Scoring Node
A scoring node is a machine running within the ScoreNet that is set-up to run InSpec and the 
ARSSE scoring module. Each scoring host is designed to be as lightweight as possible with the idea being 
that they could be run within containers, VM’s or dedicated hardware. This architecture is inherently 
scalable since each scoring host can be set-up to run its own InSpec profiles against its own specified 
targets. This can be set-up in a few different configurations but the two main ones are:
1) One scoring node per image: This setup will have one scoring per “image”, an image is a single 
machine that is part of the StuNet. So if each student has 5 machines in their network and there 
are 10 students, this setup will have 5 scoring hosts with each scoring host responsible for 10 
machines. This setup will run 1 InSpec profile against 10 machines per scoring run
2) One scoring node per student: Given the same number of students and images as above, this setup 
will have 10 scoring hosts with each scoring host being responsible for running 5 InSpec profiles 
per scoring run
Note: The calculation above assumes that each image will only have one InSpec profile running 
against but there is nothing stopping multiple profiles from being run against the same host. An example 
of this would be running a profile that checks for valid users against all images, in this case, you could be 
running 2 profiles per image since there is 1 profile for the common users and another one for everything 
else.
Student Network
The student network as shown in Figure 1 represents the network given to a single student so if 
we had 10 students then the overall system would comprise of 1 scoring network and 10 student networks 
(StuNet). We’ll call each machine in the StuNet a client. A client has no ARSSE infrastructure running on 
it and is completely isolated from the ScoreNet apart from having to allow SSH or WinRM connections to 
a selectable port from the ScoreNet scoring hosts.
Cloud Network
The cloud network(CloudNet) is separate from ScoreNet and student. This is where the Web 
frontend for students to view current scores and the web frontend for the instructor to add new challenges 
will be set up. For ease of use, both these components are suggested to be placed on a public-facing
network so the scores can be viewed and the challenges managed from anywhere in the world. The 
minimum requirement for the ARSSE scoring to work is outbound TCP 80/443 access from ScoreNet to 
CloudNet and the same from StuNet so students can see their scores and what challenges they got scored 
for. The architecture diagram in Figure 1 shows the API and web server for the web frontends as running 
on different machines but there is no restriction that they cannot be on the same host. CloudNet does not 
need any access into StuNet or ScoreNet and thus both StuNet and ScoreNet can live behind NAT.
Communication Protocol
All communication between the scoring hosts and the API is done via JSON messages sent to 
HTTP endpoints. This approach allows ScoreNet to be behind NAT. The web frontends will also 
consume endpoints on the same API. The API uses the correct HTTP verbs to signify how an operation 
may affect the data, for example, a GET request will never change data and a POST request will always 
be expected to change data. Endpoints that are not supposed to change data will respond to POST requests 
with HTTP 405.
Results
As mentioned above, intensive performance testing was not performed due to resource 
limitations. But simple tests showed promising results, simple timing tests for small InSpec profiles 
showed that a majority of the time spent was due to network latency between the ScoreNet and StuNet.
control 'test-sshd-port' do
title 'Server: Check SSH server config security' 
impact 0.6
desc 'SSH server mst be running on port 22' 
describe sshd_config do
its('Port') { should cmp 22 }
end
control 'test-ssh-root-login' do
title 'Server: Check if root is allowed to login over SSH' 
desc 'Root shoujld not be able to login over SSH' 
impact 0.7
describe sshd_config do
its ('PermitRootLogin') { should cmp 'no' }
end
control 'Nginx should not be running' do
title 'Nginx should not be running'
desc 'Webserver Nginx should not be running'
impact 0.3
describe service(nginx.service) do 
it { should_not be_running }
end
end
control 'Nginx should be disabled' do 
title 'Nginx should be disabled' 
desc 'Webserver Nginx should be disabled' 
impact 0.3
describe service(nginx.service) do 
it { should_not be_enabled }
end
end
Listing 2: InSpec profile used for timing tests 
Listing 2 shows the InSpec profile that was used for timing tests to show whether the approach used in 
this project is fast enough to provide feedback useful for a fast-paced learning environment. This profile 
was run against a DigitalOcean server located in San Francisco from my laptop located in Reston, 
Virginia. The experiment setup was a simple 2 machine set up with my laptop acting as a single scoring 
node that was responsible for a single StuNet machine.
Task CPU Time (s) Wall Clock including SSH (s)
Code 2 InSpec profile execution 
time
0.7 9.3
Dev-Sec Linux Package 
Baseline InSpec profile 
execution time(Dev-Sec)
2.2 11.7
SSH to server 1.11
Table 1: SSH connection and InSpec timing results
InSpec profiles return how long they took to run with the results. This built-in timing feature was 
used to measure the CPU time. Experimentation found that this timing did not include the setup time 
(Time taken to establish the SSH connection for this test) so we ran some rudimentary testing to measure 
the overall time taken. As seen from the results in Table 1, a comprehensive test developed to test a 
machine against industry-standard recommendations will take approximately 11.7 seconds to run in a 
scenario where the scoring node and StuNet machines are located on opposite sides of the United States. 
The difference between just adding the InSpec profile execution time and the SSH connection time and 
the actual time taken to run the InSpec tests over SSH may include time to startup the ruby interpreter,
parse the profile files, time taken to return the results (in JSON) over the network amongst other unknown 
tasks. Since we can safely assume that the SSH setup time will be lower when the scoring nodes and 
StuNet machines are within the same virtual environment or in the same building as is expected in a 
classroom or CCDC styled competition, these results are expected to be lower when run in an actual 
exercise. This shows that this remote scoring strategy of using InSpec over SSH is viable.
Conclusion
This project aimed to find out if creating an open-source, scalable, and easy to deploy system to 
score cybersecurity exercises was possible. The big hurdle towards creating an open-source project was 
ensuring data integrity since access to source code could make it a little easier for students to manipulate 
the scoring. This issue was solved by the ARSSE architecture which moved the scoring infrastructure 
away from the student machines and onto a secure network controlled by the instructor. Next was 
scalability, this challenge was met by designing a distributed architecture and the scoring software to be 
easy to set-up. Verifying scalability means running various tests in different configurations. However, due 
to limited resources, this was not possible but the scalability looks promising based on limited testing and 
the fact that InSpec is used by big organizations for IT compliance purposes.
InSpec depends upon profiles written as individual ruby files. This file-based approach was 
integrated into the ARSSE scoring module to provide a consistent configuration interface to the entire 
system. A scoring node is configured by placing the appropriate InSpec profiles and private SSH keys (for 
SSH access) into a predefined folder structure. The scoring module will create the required folders and the 
base directory can be configured easily. The InSpec results are returned as JSON files in the same 
directory structure and everything is grouped by the IP address of the machine being scored. This pure 
file-based approach removes the need for complex dependencies such as a database to store the 
configuration for the scoring node.
Future Work
The ARSSE project establishes a framework that can be used for scoring gamified cybersecurity 
exercises. This project shows that it is possible to build a scalable, easy to use, and secure system that 
relies heavily on well supported open-source tools to provide a fast feedback-based learning environment 
for defensive cybersecurity exercises. While all the individual pieces shown in the architecture diagram
are available and will soon be released on Github, these pieces could not be hooked together to make a 
production-ready system due to time limitations. Releasing the work as open source allows anyone who is 
interested in this project to continue this work and build the system into something that may one day be 
used to score cybersecurity training exercises.
While performance has been tested, future work could also involve more thorough testing and 
contributing recommendations on how to best distribute scoring nodes for best performance.
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